Abstract: The Ethiopian government initiated the Ethiopian Coffee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative in 2004 for three coffee origins: Sidama, Yirgacheffe and Harar. Following a court case between Starbucks and the Ethiopian government regarding this initiative, Oxfam organized a publicity campaign. This paper evaluates the effect of these interventions on the export prices of trademarked Ethiopian coffees. We find that the prices of the trademarked coffees increased by about 10\% following these interventions. The magnitude of this change is comparable with the farm gate prices reported in the literature; however, we cannot establish direct causation or observe the passthrough into farm gate prices. 
coffee output is produced by over one million small-scale producers and more than 10 million Ethiopians belong to the coffee value chain directly or indirectly (Bastin & Matteucci, 2007) .
The Ethiopian government took a bold step based on intellectual property rights to control the value chain and to protect the names of its high quality coffees. In 2004 the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) collaborated with Light Years IP, a development group based in Washington DC, to create a system that would capture more of the retail value of Ethiopia's fine coffees within the country. The result was The Ethiopian Coffee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative led by the EIPO in conjunction and consultation with the Ethiopian Fine Coffee Stakeholder Committee that consists of growers, small traders, exporters, cooperatives and local development bodies (Ethiopian Coffee Network, ECN (n.d.) ). Within this framework, Ethiopia is registering trademarks in foreign markets for three fine coffee types: Yirgacheffe, Sidama, and Harar, and then licensing importers and others involved in the distribution of these coffees for the use of these terms.
Twenty-nine countries had signed the Trademark and Licensing Initiative as of August
2009 (Belete, 2009 ).
The goal of this Initiative is to de-commodify Ethiopian fine coffees and de-link their price from the New York Exchange based price for Arabica coffee. The signatories enter into a brand management strategy with the government and public promotions. All companies that want to promote these will need a license (ECN, n.d.) . Although the licenses are royalty free, the Ethiopian government expects the brand management strategy to increase global demand for specialty coffees and create wealth in the long run (Kurata, 2008) .
Trademarks are also expected to give the government more leverage in managing the whole supply and distribution chain and increase the share that farmers receive from the retail coffee price.
The road to successful registration of trademarks in some countries, however, was not smooth. In 2005, the Ethiopian government filed applications in the US to register all three names as trademarks. At that time, Starbucks had already an ongoing application to register the name of "Shirkina Sundried Sidamo" and filed a suit against the Ethiopian governments claims to register "Sidamo" as a trademark. by this Initiative and publicity will improve our understanding of the roles of different schemes to protect intellectual property. It will also shed light into the question of whether trademarks are a viable tool to help poor farmers benefit from the increasing trade in specialty products from developing countries.
In Section 1, we present an overview of the global coffee market with special focus on Ethiopia. We describe the Ethiopian coffee value chain and the current developments in Ethiopian coffee industry in Section 2 in order to provide a general understanding of the background for the Trademarking and Licensing Initiative. We describe the data and present some descriptive statistics in Section 3 and present the results of our empirical analysis in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with policy recommendations.
World Coffee Market
Ninety percent of world coffee is produced in developing countries, whereas most of it is consumed by developed countries. World production of coffee in 2008 was 7.6 million metric tons, 60% of which was produced by the top four producing countries, i.e. Brazil, Vietnam, Colombia and Ethiopia (ICO).
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Similar to other primary commodities, coffee prices are highly volatile and show periods of high prices followed by oversupply and low prices (Daviron & Ponte, 2005) . The international Coffee Agreement (ICA) played a role
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The name of the "Sidama" region is subject to political debate. We use the name "Sidamo" when referring to the legal procedure that explicitly was about that term. In the rest of the article we use "Sidama" in keeping with current practice: http://sidamatimes.blogspot.com/2007/10/ worldwide-campaign-to-stamp-out-sidamo.html To read more about the Oxfam campaign see: http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/campaigns/ coffee/news_publications/starbucks-campaign-anatomy-of-a-win 3 International Coffee Organization, Total Production of Exporting Countries: http://www.ico.org/ prices/po.htm.
in stabilizing prices but since its expiration in 1989, prices have been more volatile. In 2002, real coffee prices were at their lowest level in a century which was termed "the coffee crisis."
Producing countries liberalized their domestic coffee sectors to varying degrees after the expiration of ICA. Ethiopian coffee market has also undergone liberalization efforts, especially following the fall of the Derg regime in 1991. The reforms reduced the role of government in coffee marketing, increased the role of private exporters, and allowed for direct exports of coffee through farmers' cooperatives (Gemech & Struthers, 2007) . Previous research shows that these reforms increased the price volatility and price transmission from World market to domestic market in Ethiopia (Gemech & Struthers, 2007; Worako et al. , 2008) .
During the period of domestic reform in producing countries, the "coffee paradox" was in the making in the world coffee market. Daviron & Ponte (2005) define the coffee paradox as the coexistence of a coffee price crisis in producing countries with a coffee price boom in consuming countries. The main reason underlying the coffee paradox is identified as the change in the value chain structure from a producer driven to a consumer driven chain.
Most of the value is now added in consuming countries by roasters and retailers, hence decreasing the share captured in producing countries.
Producing countries that have a potential to add intangible value to their coffees have attempted to take advantage of this shift in emphasis by consumers. The demand for specialty coffees, e.g. organic, fair trade, bird friendly and single origin, had been increasing in spite of the stagnant overall demand. Ethiopian coffee has always received a price premium in international markets due to its fine quality (Teuber, 2007) . Ethiopian coffees receive consistently more than 90 points in international tastings. Trademarks vs Geographical Indicators. In order to capture more of the value of the single origin coffees in producing countries some form of intellectual property tool must be used. Geographical designations can be protected by trademarks or geographical indicators, both of which have different benefits and costs in different settings (Schuessler, 2009) . trademarks are traditionally owned by a particular enterprise, whereas geographical indicators can be used by anyone who complies with the standards. Schuessler (2009) defines the main distinction between trademarks and geographical indicators as the fact that trademarks identify the producer of a product or service, geographical indicators identify the place of origin and characteristics that derive from that origin. For the case of Ethiopian Trademarking and Licensing Initiative, however, this distinction is blurred since the trademark identifies the place of origin and characteristics, and it is owned by the government itself rather than a private enterprise.
Ethiopian government justifies the novel choice of trademarks as a tool to protect the geographical designations of its coffees with two main claims. First, the main goal of the Trademarking Initiative is stated as "gaining more control over the market" and geographical indicators are assumed to give not as much control to their owner as trademarks do.
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Second, the Ethiopian coffee sector is characterized with more than one million smallholder producers on over four million small plots which would make registering and enforcing geographical indicators very difficult and costly (Rotstein & Christie, 2009 ).
Consequently trademarks were chosen over geographical indicators, which was the main reason behind the conflict between the Ethiopian government, Starbucks and the SCAA.
The government is currently planing to extend the trademarks to two more coffee origins.
Before an extension is implemented, it is essential to understand how the existing Initiative and the Starbucks publicity affected the prices of these coffees. One of the main goals of Ethiopian government was to improve the incomes of its small-scale coffee farmers. There is anecdotal evidence that the Initiative is making improvements in the lives of farmers in villages, however there is no quantitative study that supports this claim. Ideally the effect of the Initiative on farmers' livelihoods should be studied using farmer level panel data from regions covered by the trademark and those that are not. However, given the fact that any 5 Schuessler (2009) mentions that while this may be true in many markets, in the US both trademarks and geographical indicators can provide similar levels of control all the way down to the retail level.
program needs to affect the export prices before its effects can reach farmers, our study is a first step in understanding the effects of the Initiative on the prices of trademarked coffees.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We analyze the historical price development of all types of Ethiopian coffee to identify whether and how Trademark Initiative and Starbucks publicity affected the prices of Sidama, Yirgacheffe and Harar coffees vis-á-vis coffees of other origins using data from the These data, however, do not differentiate between grades or specific origins of coffees within producing countries. Therefore, we use ICO data only to provide a general overview of the global coffee market. These figures however do not tell us much about the share of the producers' prices in the final retail price. Daviron & Ponte (2005) show that the farm gate price in Uganda is around 7% of the retail price along the Uganda-Italy supermarket value chain (pp.208).
Light Years IP found that Ethiopian farmers were receiving around 6% of the final retail We thank to Mohammad Garad from the Light Years Intellectual Property (LYIP) for his support in obtaining this data.
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ICO: http://www.ico.org/about_statistics.asp. This big discrepancy motivated the Ethiopian government to establish the Initiative in order to capture more of the retail value within the country.
The government believes that most of this value is created in the regions where these coffees are grown -otherwise roasters would have been able to create the same value for other coffees of different origin as well.
In order to understand the effects of the Initiative on coffee prices, one needs to differentiate between different origins, grades (Ethiopian export coffee is graded from 1 to 5) and certification status (e.g. organic, fair trade...etc.). The ICO data does not cover these important determinants of coffee prices. The Ethiopian Customs data include detailed information and allow us to control for all these characteristics that affect the price of coffee.
Almost all commercial coffee production in Ethiopia takes place in two main regions:
Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities (SNNP). Sidama and Yirgacheffe are in SNNP, while Harar is in Oromia region.
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The three trademarked coffees make up around 43% of total exported coffee registered by the Ethiopian Customs, and Sidama alone is around 30% of the total (Table 1) . Sidama is the name of a region; Yirgacheffe is the name of a village in Sidama with special agro-ecological conditions; and Harar is the name of a city. These different definitions of the origins of trademarked coffees created confusion during the registry process of trademarks (Garad, 2009 
Empirical Analysis
The main goal of the econometric analysis is to identify whether the Trademarking
Initiative and the related publicity have coincided with an increase in the prices of the trademarked coffees as opposed to other Ethiopian coffees. For illustrative purposes, we first estimate the monthly price premiums for all origins running the following regression separately for each month:
Sidama, Yirgacheffe and Harar are dummy variables identifying the trademarked coffees, O −T M is a vector of dummies for coffee origins that are not trademarked (including unknown origin), G is a vector of grade dummies identifying grades from undergrade to grade 4 (grade 5 is the reference category) and i indicates each transaction in the data set.
We exclude organic and fair trade certified coffees that constitute less than 1% of the total coffee exports in order to prevent convoluting the price effect of these standards with that of the trademark. in the prices of trademarked coffees as compared to other coffees, we run the following regression: including the most common coffee origins in the data and G is a vector of grade dummies.
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We control for the supply effect by including a variable that is equal to the percentage of the total coffee sold in a given month from each origin (V). In order to better identify the main coefficients of interest, i.e. α and β, we also include monthly dummies (T) to control for any aggregate coffee price movements and month-origin interactions (TO) to control for origin-specific seasonality. Table 3 presents the results of the regression in equation 2, where all observations are weighted by the physical weight of the transaction. (Teuber, 2007) . Estimating a price effect that is compatible with these long established origin premiums with a trademark and international publicity can be done with these data. Kodama (2007) (ECX, 2008) . Price discovery should improve farmers' share of the retail price as opposed to the current system where farmers do not have the opportunity of finding out the quality of their coffee when they sell it to traders. In spite of its flexible system intended to accommodate very detailed grade and origin groups, the ECX has come under pressure from international specialty coffee traders who wanted to buy directly from farmers to ensure traceability (Mezlekia, 2009 ). The ECX recently introduced the Direct Specialty Trade where international buyers directly buy from small coffee cooperatives with a requirement that farmers receive a minimum of 85% of the final export price (ECX, 2010) . Prices on the first day of trading ranged between US$2.15-4.02, which would constitute a significant increase for farmers if they really receive the stated share.
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These developments combined with the Trademark
Initiative are intended to increase farmers' share of the retail price, though detailed analyses tracking farmer incomes over time are required to see whether they will be able to do so.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
We analyze the change in origin premia following Ethiopian Trademarking and Licensing Initiative and the international publicity it created, using data on the export prices of Ethiopian coffee. We use detailed data from the Ethiopian Customs Department that records every coffee transaction in detail including origin, grade and certification status.
Oxfam organized an international campaign in response to Starbucks' refusal to sign the Trademarking Initiative, which created significant global publicity and awareness of the poverty among the millions of Ethiopian coffee farmers. We find that the Oxfam campaign was followed by an economically significant price increase in the trademarked coffees (Sidama, Yirgacheffe and Harar) which is comparable to the farm gate price of coffee in the region reported in other studies, though it will take more work to see if this has materially affected farmers' share of income from the coffee value chain. If farmers receive the same share of export income as they did before, then these relative price changes have translated to income increases on the order of seven to sixteen percent.
Compared to other government Initiatives like the Direct Specialty Trade at the ECX, the effects of the Trademarking and Licensing Initiative and the publicity seem fairly small.
In the absence of an international outcry like the Starbucks case created, it may be hard to create a significant impact with the silent registration of trademarks in importing countries. The efforts to increase demand for Ethiopian coffee through trademarking need to be coupled with other interventions to increase the prices significantly. These initiatives alone will not be enough, however, to achieve the Ethiopian Government's laudable goal of improving the welfare of its millions of small-scale coffee farmers. An improved local market structure should be supported with improved extension services targeted to quality management and marketing to achieve this goal. Future studies need to focus on rigorous data collection and direct analysis of farmers' welfare in order to identify the best approaches of improving the welfare of the producers of these specialty coffees in a fast changing local and international coffee market.
